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FOR BETTER AND WORSE: THE DIFFERING
INCOME TAX TREATMENTS OF MARRIAGE
AT DIFFERENT INCOME LEVELS*
LAWRENCE ZELENAK**
Although both marriage penalties and marriage bonuses exist at
all income levels under the federal income tax, the system is tilted
toward penalties for lower-income couples, toward bonuses for
middle-income couples, and back toward penalties for upperincome couples. This Article begins by explaining how the tax
rules produce these differing treatments of marriage at different
points in the income distribution. It then argues that the increase
in recent decades in the social acceptability and prevalence of
cohabitation makes tax marriage effects a more serious
concern—in terms of both behavioral effects and fairness—than
in earlier decades. After demonstrating that Congress has never
offered any justification for the differing tax treatments of
marriage at different income levels, and that no plausible defense
exists for the current distribution of penalties and bonuses, the
Article offers several policy recommendations. The most basic
and most important recommendation is simply that, whatever
Congress does in this area, it should make conscious decisions
about the appropriate distributions of penalties and bonuses at
various income levels, instead of following its current practice of
stumbling into a set of poorly understood and almost-impossibleto-defend effects.
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INTRODUCTION: MARRIAGE PENALTIES, MARRIAGE BONUSES, OR
BOTH
It is the classic trilemma of the income tax treatment of marriage.
As a matter of simple arithmetic, it is impossible for a tax system to
feature simultaneously (1) progressive marginal tax rates, (2) joint
filing by married couples (in the service of producing equal taxes on
equal-income married couples), and (3) marriage neutrality (that is,
no tax marriage penalties or bonuses).1 If the legislature insists on the
first two features, as Congress has for many decades, then the third
desideratum is unachievable.2 Instead of marriage neutrality—under
which any two people would pay the same combined tax whether
unmarried or married—there will be marriage penalties, marriage
bonuses, or both. Although a legislature committed to the first two
goals must violate marriage neutrality, the legislature has a great deal
of freedom to determine whether, and to what extent, to skew the
neutrality violations toward either marriage penalties or marriage
bonuses.3
The choices facing the legislature can be illustrated with a simple
two-bracket tax rate system, featuring an exemption level (in effect, a
zero bracket) and a single positive rate applying to all income above
the exemption. Suppose the legislature begins by setting the rate
structure for single taxpayers: a $50,000 exemption, and a flat tax of
20% on income above the exemption. Given the decision to tax a
1. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-175, TAX
ADMINISTRATION: INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED AND SINGLE INDIVIDUALS 2
(1996) [hereinafter GAO] (“The trade-offs among these principles exist because, as public
finance experts have long recognized, a tax system cannot satisfy all three principles
simultaneously.”). For consideration of this trilemma, see, for example, Anne L. Alstott,
Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and Social Security in the Age of
Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 698 (2013).
2. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 1, at 2 (“[O]ur current tax system . . . has progressive
tax rates and taxes married couples with the same income equally. However, this can
result in the income of some married couples falling into different tax brackets than would
be the case if they were to file as single individuals. Therefore, the present tax system is
not ‘marriage neutral’ . . . .”).
3. See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for
the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (discussing legislative options).
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married couple on their combined income, without regard to how the
income is distributed between the spouses, the only remaining
question for the legislature is the exemption amount for married
couples.
There are two polar choices, and any number of intermediate
options. At one extreme, the legislature could choose to set the
exemption level for married couples at the same amount—$50,000—
applicable to single taxpayers. This choice would result in marriage
neutrality for one-earner couples, substantial marriage penalties for
two-earner couples, and marriage bonuses for no one. If two people
had individual incomes of $120,000 and zero, their combined tax
liabilities as singles would be $14,000 (a 20% tax on $70,000 of aboveexemption income on the one, and no tax on the other), and their tax
as a married couple would also be $14,000 (again, a 20% tax on
$70,000). This is tax marriage neutrality for one-earner couples. If two
people each had individual incomes of $60,000, they would pay a
combined tax of $4,000 as singles (a 20% tax on $10,000 for each), but
they would owe $14,000 tax as a married couple with a combined
income of $120,000. The result is a $10,000 marriage penalty on the
equal-income two-earner couple. Married couples with income splits
between 100-zero and 50-50 would also be subject to marriage
penalties, although their penalties would not be as large as that of the
50-50 couple. For example, a couple with individual incomes of
$90,000 and $30,000 would pay a combined tax of $8,000 as singles
(imposed on the $40,000 above-exemption income of the higher
earner), compared with a joint return liability of $14,000—resulting in
a marriage penalty of $6,000.
At the other extreme, the legislature might decide to set the
exemption level for married couples at $100,000—twice the
exemption level for single taxpayers. In that case there would be
marriage neutrality for equal-income two-earner couples, and
marriage bonuses for everyone else. The couple with individual
incomes of $60,000 and $60,000, with a combined tax bill of $4,000 as
singles, would also owe $4,000 (on $20,000 of above-exemption
income) as a married couple filing a joint return. The one-earner
couple with incomes of $120,000 and zero, with a $14,000 combined
tax bill as singles, would owe only $4,000 tax as a married couple;
their marriage bonus would be $10,000. The couple with incomes of
$90,000 and $30,000, with an $8,000 combined tax bill as singles,
would also owe only $4,000 as a married couple; their marriage bonus
would be $4,000.
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Between these two extremes, the legislature could set the joint
return exemption level at more than the singles exemption but less
than twice the singles exemption. Instead of producing either
penalties without bonuses, or bonuses without penalties, any
intermediate approach will produce both bonuses and penalties.
Suppose, for example, that the legislature decides to split the
difference by setting the joint return exemption at $75,000—that is,
1.5 times the singles exemptions. In that case there will be both
marriage bonuses for one-earner couples and other couples with very
unequal divisions of income, and marriage penalties for two-earner
couples with more nearly equal divisions of income. Although having
both penalties and bonuses might seem like the worst of both worlds,
this intermediate approach produces smaller penalties than the onlypenalties approach and smaller bonuses than the only-bonuses
approach. The one-earner couple with $120,000 income enjoys a
marriage bonus of $5,000 ($9,000 tax married versus $14,000
combined tax unmarried). This is $5,000 less than their marriage
bonus under the bonuses-only approach. The equal-income twoearner couple (each with $60,000 income) faces a marriage penalty of
$5,000 ($9,000 tax married versus $4,000 combined tax as singles).
This is $5,000 less than their marriage penalty under the penaltiesonly approach.
In any intermediate system, there is a breakeven division of
income (which may be different, however, at different combined
income levels). With the intermediate system imagined here, the
breakeven division of $120,000 would be $95,000 and $25,000
(roughly 79% and 21% of combined income). A couple with those
incomes would pay the same combined tax—$9,000—whether
married or unmarried. As illustrated by the examples in the preceding
paragraph, a couple with $120,000 combined income and a more
unequal income division would enjoy a marriage bonus, while a
couple with the same combined income and a less unequal division of
income would suffer a marriage penalty.
These examples are offered in support of two simple points.
First, if we are to have progressive marginal rates and joint filing by
married couples, then we are forced to accept that the tax system will
not be marriage neutral. Second, even within the constraints of
progressive rates and joint filing, a legislature has choices as to the
nature of the marriage non-neutralities. Basically, the options are (1)
big marriage penalties and no marriage bonuses, (2) big marriage
bonuses and no marriage penalties, and (3) both penalties and
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bonuses, but smaller penalties than under the first option and smaller
bonuses than under the second option. As a matter of first
impression, it might seem that the fairest approach (assuming that
reconsideration of the commitments to progressive rates and joint
filing is not an option) would be the splitting of the difference
embodied in option three. If marriage penalties and bonuses are an
unfortunate result of the marriage tax trilemma, rather than the
embodiment of a legislative decision to penalize or subsidize
marriage,4 then a system with little or no net marriage penalty or
bonus—because total penalties and bonuses in the system are roughly
equal and offsetting—may be the best that can be done. This
approach could be thought of as a rebuttable presumption, under
which the choice should be to split the difference unless there is a
persuasive reason to skew the system toward penalties or bonuses.
Broadly speaking, the current federal income tax does split the
difference, in the sense that it features both substantial marriage
penalties and substantial marriage bonuses.5 What is odd, however, is
that the system splits the difference quite differently at different
income levels.6 A simple way of measuring how the system splits the
difference is to compare, at various income levels, the maximum
marriage bonus (for a one-earner couple) and the maximum marriage
penalty (for an equal-income two-earner couple).7 If the two
maximums are the same, the system splits the difference evenly. If the
maximum bonus is larger than the maximum penalty, the system is
skewed toward bonuses. And, of course, if the maximum penalty is
larger than the maximum bonus, the system is skewed toward
penalties.

4. See Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1509, 1529 (2006) (“[O]ver the years most critics have regarded the
marriage bonus created by income splitting as an undesirable but tolerable side
effect . . . .”). But see id. (“[O]utside of academia, the principle of marriage neutrality is
not necessarily taken for granted. Some people believe that the government should
actively promote marriage, and that the benefits of marriage-based income splitting
present an appropriate means of doing so. Though Congress did not create the ‘marriage
bonus’ as a marriage-promotion vehicle, many politicians and their constituents have
grown to view it and defend it as such.”).
5. See, e.g., GAO, supra note 1, at 2 (“Generally, large income differences between
spouses can lead to marriage bonuses while roughly equal incomes can lead to marriage
penalties.”).
6. See infra Table 1 and accompanying notes.
7. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (formerly, the General Accounting
Office) also uses this method of measurement. See GAO, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.1.
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Table 1 sets forth the maximum marriage penalties and bonuses
at selected combined income levels, under the federal income tax
rules in effect for 2014.8 As shown in Table 1, at the very low
combined-income level of $20,000, the system splits the difference
almost perfectly; the maximum bonus and the maximum penalty
differ by only $4. The picture is very different, however, at the
moderately low income level of $40,000. When there is one
“qualifying child” (for purposes of the child tax credit,9 the earned
income credit,10 and the dependency exemption11), the maximum
penalty is more than twice the maximum bonus. And when there are
two qualifying children at the $40,000 income level, the maximum
penalty is 2.7 times the maximum bonus. (The maximum penalty of
$4,271 is also impressively large in percentage-of-income terms, at
more than 10% of the combined pre-tax income of the couple.)
Remarkably, this skewing toward penalties is utterly reversed in the
middle-income ranges. At $90,000 combined income, the maximum
bonus is $5,334 and the maximum penalty is zero. There is a rereversal in the upper-income ranges. At $1,000,000 of combined
income the maximum penalty (of more than $32,000) is almost three
times the maximum bonus. In sum, the system is strongly skewed
toward penalties for the working class, is maximally skewed toward
bonuses for the middle class, and is again strongly skewed toward
penalties for the wealthy.12

8. See infra Part II for detailed explanations of the relevant tax liability calculations.
9. I.R.C. § 24 (2012).
10. Id. § 32.
11. Id. § 151(c).
12. In a 1996 study, the General Accounting Office identified fifty-nine income tax
provisions under which tax liability depends on marital status. GAO, supra note 1, at 3.
The number may well be higher today. See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 202
(“There are more than two hundred Code provisions and Treasury regulations relating to
the internal revenue laws that include the terms ‘spouse,’ ‘marriage,’ . . . ‘husband and
wife,’ ‘husband,’ and ‘wife.’ ”). Most of those provisions, however, are of limited
applicability. See GAO, supra note 1, at 3. This Article focuses on the marriage effects of a
small number of basic structural provisions of wide applicability.
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Table 1: Maximum Marriage Bonuses and Penalties at Selected
Combined Income Levels Under 2014 Federal Income Tax Rules13
Maximum
Bonus

Maximum
Penalty

$20,000 (with one qualifying child)

$347

$351

$40,000 (with one qualifying child)

$1,265

$2,579

$40,000 (with two qualifying children)

$1,581

$4,271

$90,000 (no children14)

$5,284

zero

$1,000,000 (no children15)

$12,749

$32,660

Combined Income

The different skewings at different income levels are not
necessarily irrational. Couples with $40,000 combined income are
differently situated from those with $90,000 income, who in turn are
very differently situated from those with $1,000,000 income, so it is
not inconceivable that policy considerations could favor marriage
penalties for the first and third groups, while favoring marriage
bonuses for the middle group. On the other hand, Congress has never
offered an explanation for those different treatments (it is not clear
that Congress even realizes what it has done in this area), and
certainly no explanation comes readily to mind.16

13. All calculations assume that taxpayers claim the standard deduction rather than
itemizing deductions. Compare I.R.C. § 63(c) (standard deduction), with I.R.C. §§ 161–
199, 211–224 (itemized deductions). The assumption is rather unrealistic at higher income
levels, but it does not dramatically affect the maximum bonus and penalty calculations. See
Zelenak, supra note 3, at 56 & nn.220–21 (showing that the popularity of the standard
deduction generally declines as income increases). For unmarried one-earner couples, the
calculations assume that the earning partner can and does claim the non-earning partner
as a dependent. I.R.C. § 151(b).
14. If there were a child, then one of the two-earner unmarried taxpayers could file as
a head of household, I.R.C. § 2(b), which would create a small maximum marriage penalty
at this combined income level.
15. Both the child tax credit and dependency exemptions are fully phased out at this
income level, I.R.C. §§ 24(b) (child tax credit), 151(d)(3) (dependency exemptions), so the
presence or absence of children would be relevant only with respect to the availability of
head-of-household filing status in the unmarried case.
16. See infra Part III (describing the failure of Congress to offer explanations for the
different skewing between marriage penalties and bonuses at different income levels).
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This Article takes a critical look at the differing distributions of
marriage penalties and bonuses at different combined income
levels—skewed toward penalties at the bottom and top, and toward
bonuses in the middle—under the federal income tax. Part I explains
how the dramatic increase in recent decades in the prevalence and
social acceptability of cohabitation has made tax marriage penalties
and bonuses a more serious concern than ever before, in terms of
both fairness and incentive effects (especially with respect to the
choice between cohabitation and marriage).
Part II describes in some detail the sources and distribution of
marriage penalties and bonuses under current law—including
explanations of how the tax laws produce the results set forth in Table
1. It notes that, although discussions of marriage penalties and
bonuses have traditionally focused on the basic tax rate structure of
§ 1 of the Internal Revenue Code,17 other Code provisions also
produce marriage effects.18 At lower income levels, the earned
income credit19 (“EIC”) tends to be a more important source of
marriage effects than the basic rate structure.20 At higher income
levels, the alternative minimum tax21 (“AMT”) is a major source of
marriage effects (mostly penalties) for couples within its domain.22
Several provisions recently added by the Affordable Care Act23—
most notably the premium tax credit24 and the 3.8% tax on investment
income of upper-income taxpayers25—also produce significant
marriage effects (again, mostly penalties) for the couples to whom
they apply. Part II also explains that the magnitude of marriage tax
effects (as contrasted with the skewing of the effects toward penalties
or bonuses) is a function of the extent of the marginal tax rate

17.
18.
19.
20.

I.R.C. § 1.
See, e.g., id. §§ 32, 36B, 55–59, 1411.
Id. § 32.
See generally JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-653 E, THE
MARRIAGE PENALTY AND OTHER FAMILY TAX ISSUES 2 (1998) (“In the case of the
EITC, penalties can occur because larger aggregated incomes cause loss of the credit
through income phase-outs.”).
21. I.R.C. §§ 55–59.
22. See generally GRAVELLE, supra note 20, at 2 (“The effect of marriage on tax
liability was exacerbated by the higher [AMT] rates introduced in 1993 at the top of the
income distribution . . . .”).
23. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
24. Id. § 1401, 124 Stat. at 213–20 (codified at I.R.C. § 36B).
25. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1402, 124 Stat. 1029, 1061–63 (codified at I.R.C. § 1411).
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progressivity built into § 1 and other provisions with rate-like effects.
The less progressive the system—in terms of marginal rate
structure—the smaller the penalties or bonuses resulting from the
joint taxation of married couples.26
Part III considers whether there is any plausible policy
justification for mostly penalizing marriage for working class couples,
while overwhelmingly rewarding marriage for the middle class and
mostly penalizing marriage for the upper class. The task requires
some imagination, given that Congress has never attempted to justify
these disparate treatments. After considering some reasons why
legislative tax policy toward marriage might vary by income level,
Part III concludes that the particular differences embodied in the
current income tax structure are difficult or impossible to defend.
Part IV concludes with four tentative policy recommendations.
First: At all income levels, Congress should pay attention to marriage
effects and should make conscious decisions about whether to skew
the rules toward penalties or toward bonuses, or to split the
difference. As modest as this suggestion surely is, its adoption would
constitute a dramatic departure from standard operating procedure in
this area. Second: In making those conscious decisions, Congress
should start with a rebuttable presumption that the same balance
between penalties and bonuses should be struck at all income levels,
and with a rebuttable presumption that the most appropriate balance
is to split the difference. The burden of persuasion should be on
anyone arguing for different treatments of marriage at different
income levels, and on anyone arguing for net marriage penalties or
bonuses at any income level. There is one area where it is quite
possible that both presumptions can be overcome; a case can be made
for a tilt toward marriage bonuses for lower-income couples. Third:
The problems of marriage penalties and bonuses are so significant
and so intractable as to call for a reconsideration of the commitment
to the principle of equal tax on equal-income couples (and thus to
joint returns). Fourth: Congress should seriously consider ways of
decreasing tax marriage effects without sacrificing progressivity, by
making greater use of techniques to produce average rate
progressivity without using progressive marginal rates (of which the

26. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 339, 341 (1994) (“The more progressive the rate structure, the more significant the
tax effects of joint returns.”).
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prototype is a system of universal “demogrants” financed by a flat
rate tax).
I. WHY TAX MARRIAGE EFFECTS MATTER: THE RISE OF
COHABITATION
Tax marriage penalties and bonuses are based on counterfactual
comparisons; spouses pay more or less tax than if they were
unmarried. The standard analysis assumes that each partner,
unmarried, would have the same income that she or he has married.
Early in the era of income tax marriage effects (beginning with
bonuses in 1948, followed by the introduction of penalties in 195127),
unmarried cohabitation was rare and generally socially
unacceptable.28 When cohabitation was not a socially available
counterfactual to marriage, neither marriage penalties nor bonuses
were likely to have much visceral impact.29 If couples did not live
together before marriage, and if going from marriage to unmarried
cohabitation was not a realistic option, couples would have had little
reason to compare their joint marital tax liability with the sum of their
27. Zelenak, supra note 3, at 4–8, 69–70 (reviewing the early history of marriage
penalties and bonuses).
28. Cohabitators represented only 1.1% of all couples in 1960, compared with 7.0% in
1997. Tom W. Smith, Ties That Bind: The Emerging 21st Century American Family, PUB.
PERSP., Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 34, 35.
The Roper Center’s extensive iPOLL Databank contains no polling on attitudes
toward cohabitation from before the 1970s. The lack of pre-1970s polling data is itself
quite telling. Apparently cohabitation was so obviously socially unacceptable that pollsters
saw no reason to ask about it. In a 1977 survey, only 26% of respondents thought it was
“okay” that there had been “an increase in the number of couples living together without
being married”; 48% thought it was “wrong” and 23% thought it did not “matter much”
or had no opinion. CBS NEWS/N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1977, available at http://www.roper
center.uconn.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/home/index.cfm (enter dataset keyword: USCBS
NYT.112677.R39). In the 1994 General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research
Center, 41% of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “It is
alright for a couple to live together without intending to get married.” NAT’L OP.
RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF CHI., Jan. 1994, available at http://www.roper
center.uconn.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/home/index.cfm
(enter
dataset
keyword:
USNORC.GSS94.Q622B). When the same question was asked in 2012, only 29%
disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF
CHI., Mar. 2012, available at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/CFIDE/cf/action/home/
index.cfm (enter dataset keyword: USNORC.GSS12C.Q1106B); see TOM W. SMITH ET
AL., NAT’L OP. RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF CHI., GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEYS, 1972–2012:
CUMULATIVE CODEBOOK 2277 (2013), available at http://publicdata.norc.org/GSS/
DOCUMENTS/BOOK/GSS_Codebook.pdf (comparing results for the same question
from 1972 to 2012).
29. See generally Zelenak, supra note 3, at 10–11 (discussing the effect on marriage
penalty analysis of changing attitudes toward cohabitation).
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unmarried tax liabilities. Their hypothetical combined tax liabilities as
two single people, not living together, would not have been a
meaningful reference point for a married couple. And unmarried
persons not living together would not have thought of themselves as
having a combined tax liability of any amount, so they would not
experience any increase or decrease in their combined tax liability
when they married and began living together. Even in the rather
unlikely event that a two-earner couple did think of their combined
tax liability as having been increased by their marriage,30 they might
have accepted it as a reasonable legislative response to the economies
of scale of having one household instead of two.31 In short, in the
absence of a realistic cohabitation counterfactual, neither marriage
bonuses nor penalties raised very compelling fairness concerns.
The story was much the same for incentive effects. If marriage
were the only socially acceptable way to have a life together, twoearner couples in love would not be dissuaded from marriage by the
prospect of a tax marriage penalty (in the unlikely event that they
even thought in marriage penalty terms). It would have been equally
implausible for an earner to marry a non-earner in order to obtain a
marriage bonus; the non-tax considerations favoring or disfavoring
the married state would overwhelm the married tax advantage (again,
in the unlikely event the persons even thought in terms of marriage
tax effects).
In recent decades there has been a striking increase in the
prevalence and social acceptability of unmarried cohabitation.32
Cohabitation has become particularly prevalent at lower-income
levels,33 where tax marriage effects tend to be large in dollar terms
30. Two equal earners might have noticed the marriage penalty if they went from
being over-withheld as singles to being under-withheld as spouses, despite the fact that
neither their incomes nor their withholding had changed. Thanks to Kathleen Thomas for
this point.
31. See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 223 (Comm. Print 1970) (defending
marriage penalties as appropriate legislative responses to marital economies of living).
32. In 1987, only 10% of American women ages 19 to 44 were living with unmarried
partners; by 2009–2010, that number had more than doubled to 23%. WENDY D.
MANNING, NAT’L CTR. FOR FAMILY & MARRIAGE RESEARCH, TRENDS IN
COHABITATION: OVER TWENTY YEARS OF CHANGE, 1987–2010, at fig.3 (2013),
available at https://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/college-of-arts-and-sciences/NCF
MR/documents/FP/FP-13-12.pdf. For data on attitudinal changes, as reflected in public
opinion polling, see the sources cited supra note 28.
33. See JONATHAN VESPA, JAMIE M. LEWIS & ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
2012, at 18–19 (2013) (reporting that “37 percent of male spouses and 16 percent of female

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 783 (2015)

794

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93

and very large in percentage-of-income terms. If couples today feel
that they have a genuine choice between cohabitation and marriage,
then tax marriage effects are a much more pressing policy concern,
with respect to both equity and incentives, than in earlier decades.
With respect to fairness, penalties and bonuses are more real, and
thus more objectionable, when they are based solely on the presence
or absence of a marriage license, than when they are bound up with
the difference between living together and living apart. And as for
incentives, it is much more plausible that a couple committed to living
together in any event would decide whether to do so with or without a
marriage license based on tax considerations, than that two people in
an earlier era would have decided whether to be a couple at all (which
they could do only through marriage) based on a tax analysis.
A large and rather inconclusive collection of empirical studies—
mostly quantitative, but a few qualitative studies as well—suggests
that, even with cohabitation as a socially available alternative to
marriage, the influence of tax on the choice between marriage and
cohabitation is somewhere in the range of small to nonexistent.34 It
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that if there are no major
behavioral effects of tax marriage penalties and bonuses, then there
are also no major policy concerns. A generation ago, Boris Bittker
suggested that tax incentives create inefficiencies to the extent
taxpayers behaviorally respond to the incentives, but that tax
incentives create inequity to the extent they do not cause taxpayers to
change their behavior.35 Although Bittker’s observation concerned
investment tax incentives, rather than incentives to seek or avoid
marriage, his point applies here as well. To the extent taxpayers
ignore tax consequences in deciding between marriage and
cohabitation, we have avoided a tax influence on marital decisions
only by acquiescing in some truly disturbing inequities. If the twoearner couple with $40,000 combined income and two children (Table
1) chooses marriage over cohabitation despite the rather astounding
tax marriage penalty of more than $4,200 (more than 10% of their
pretax income), that is every bit as troubling as if tax had driven them
to unmarried cohabitation. It does not matter whether they chose

spouses earned at least $50,000”; the comparable figures for male and female unmarried
cohabiting partners were 21% and 12%).
34. See infra notes 121–27 and accompanying text.
35. Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations
Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 746 (1979).
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marriage and the tax marriage penalty out of heroism or out of
ignorance; either way the result is grossly unfair.
II. INCOME TAX MARRIAGE PENALTIES AND BONUSES: A CLOSER
LOOK
A. Code Provisions Producing Marriage Penalties and Bonuses
This section offers a closer look at the design features of the
income tax responsible for the skewing toward marriage penalties at
$40,000 of combined income, toward bonuses at $90,000, and again
toward penalties at $1,000,000. It also describes how recent legislation
has introduced several significant new tax effects of marriage.
Although this section describes the most widely applicable sources of
marriage penalties and bonuses in the income tax, it does not attempt
a comprehensive survey of the several dozen income tax provisions,
the application of which is affected by marital status.36
For a couple with $40,000 combined income and no children, the
provisions producing marriage effects are the standard deduction, the
10% bracket, and the 15% bracket. The joint return standard
deduction is twice as large as the standard deduction for an unmarried
taxpayer (other than a head of household),37 and the joint return 10%
and 15% brackets are twice as wide as equivalent brackets for single
taxpayers (again, other than heads of households).38 The marriage tax
effects depend critically on the presence or absence of children. First
consider the treatment of childless one- and two-earner couples. A
childless one-earner married couple with $40,000 income enjoys a
marriage bonus of $1,383.75 (the difference between a joint return
liability of $2,047.50 and an unmarried tax liability of $3,431.25 on the
earning partner, on the assumption that the earning partner claims
the non-earning partner as a dependent39). In the absence of children,
there are no marriage penalties at the $40,000 combined income level.
Two childless cohabitants, each with $20,000 income, would each owe
tax of $1,023.75, resulting in a combined tax liability of $2,047.50. If

36. See GAO, supra note 1, at 3 (identifying 59 such provisions, as of 1996).
37. I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (2012).
38. Id. §§ 1(f)(8), 1(i)(1).
39. Although an earning partner can claim a non-earning cohabiting partner as a
dependent, I.R.C. § 152(d)(2)(H), the non-earning partner cannot serve as the basis for
head-of-household filing status for the earning partner, id. § 2(a)(1)(B).
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they were married, their joint return income tax liability would also
be $2,047.50.40
The marriage tax effects are different, however, in the presence
of children. If a two-earner couple has a child and is unmarried, then
one of the partners could file as a head of household and take
advantage of the head-of-household standard deduction and 10% and
15% rate brackets.41 The result is a marriage penalty, although not a
very large one. Taking into account the dependency exemption and
the child tax credit42 (but not the EIC), the marriage penalty on an
equal-earnings couple with $40,000 of combined income would be
$251.25. If one partner files as a head of household and claims the
child (for purposes of both the child tax credit and the dependency
exemption), that partner will have a federal income tax liability of
negative $700 (in other words, that partner will receive a $700 transfer
payment from the government). The other partner, filing as a single
person, will have a tax liability of $1,023.75. Their combined (net) tax
is $323.75. As a one-child married couple filing a joint return, their tax
will be $575. The $251.25 difference—all of which is due to the
availability of head-of-household status for one partner under the
unmarried option—is their marriage penalty.
But the above analysis disregards the EIC, the phaseout rules of
which can produce very large marriage penalties. The one-child EIC
is reduced by 15.98 cents for every dollar by which adjusted gross
income exceeds the phaseout threshold.43 In 2014 that threshold is
$17,830 for an unmarried taxpayer and $23,260 (far less than twice the
unmarried threshold) for a married couple.44 From the maximum onechild EIC of $3,305, the phaseout reduces the EIC of a head-ofhousehold with $20,000 income by $347, to $2,958. The EIC phaseout
hits the two-earner married couple much harder. At $40,000
combined income, the phaseout reduces their EIC by $2,675, from
$3,305 to $630. The EIC-produced marriage penalty is the $2,328
difference between the unmarried and married EICs. Combining the
marriage penalties resulting from the head-of-household rules and the

40. Tax liability calculations based on I.R.C. §§ 1(a) and 1(c) tax rate schedules, and
I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) married and single standard deduction amounts, all as inflation-adjusted
for 2014.
41. Id. §§ 1(b) (15% bracket), 1(i)(1)(B) (10% bracket), 2(b) (definition of “head of
household”), 63(c)(2)(B) (standard deduction).
42. Id. §§ 151 (dependency exemption), 24 (child tax credit).
43. Id. § 32(b)(1)(A).
44. Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 540.
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EIC phaseout, the one-child $40,000 income couple faces an income
tax marriage penalty of $2,579.25—of which more than 90% is
attributable to the EIC’s phaseout rules.
What about a one-earner couple with $40,000 income and one
child? Married, their joint return tax liability (taking into account all
relevant provisions, including the EIC) will be negative $55. If they
were unmarried and the earning partner filed as a head of household
(and claimed both the child and the non-earning partner as
dependents), the earning partner’s tax would be $1,210. The marriage
bonus—the maximum marriage bonus for a one-child couple with
$40,000 income—is $1,265. This is slightly less than half of the
maximum marriage penalty for a one-child couple at that income
level.
To the considerable extent that arguments in favor of promarriage public policies are premised on the claimed advantages to
children of having married parents,45 the above results seem perverse.
As the above analysis has shown, Congress has eliminated marriage
penalties (and provided substantial marriage bonuses) at the $40,000
combined-income level in the case of childless couples, but has tilted
the system toward marriage penalties for one-child couples at the
same income level.
The tilting is in the same direction, but even more severe, for a
couple at the same income level with two children. Again, the
marriage penalty is caused much more by the phaseout of the EIC
than by the rest of the income tax system. Disregarding the EIC for
the moment, an unmarried parent with $20,000 income, filing as a
head of household and claiming one of the children for purposes of
both the child tax credit and the dependency exemption, would have
a negative tax liability (that is, would receive a transfer payment) of
$700. Assuming the parents and the children all live together in a
single household, the other parent cannot use the other child to
support that parent’s also filing as a head of household (because there
is only one household, and the first parent has filed as its head).46 The
other parent can, however, claim one of the children for purposes of

45. For a few examples of such arguments, see infra text accompanying notes 113–16.
46. See Jackson v. Comm’r, 7154 T.C.M. (CCH) 2022, 2024 (1996) (denying head-ofhousehold status to an unmarried father, who claimed to live with his daughter in one
room of a two-bedroom house owned by the child’s mother: “We find that the one room
allegedly lived in by petitioner and [the daughter] . . . , without use of a kitchen or
telephone, does not constitute a separate household”).
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the child tax credit and the dependency exemption.47 That parent’s
tax liability, filing as a single taxpayer (other than a head of
household) will be negative $410. The combined result for the two
unmarried partners will be a negative tax (transfer payment) of
$1,110. If the couple is married and files a joint return (and again
disregarding the EIC for the moment) they would have a negative tax
of $820. The marriage penalty is a modest $290 ($1,110 – $820).
But what about the EIC? In this situation, two features of the
EIC favor two-earner unmarried cohabitants over two-earner married
couples. First, the maximum two-child credit ($5,460 in 2014)48 is
considerably less than twice the maximum one-child credit ($3,305 in
2014).49 A married couple with two children is relegated to the twochild credit, but unmarried cohabiting parents can divide the children
between them for EIC purposes, with each claiming the one-child
EIC.50 Second, as in the one-child situation, the EIC phaseout rules
produce large marriage penalties for two-earner couples with similar
incomes. Dividing the children between them, each unmarried
partner will be entitled to a one-child EIC (after phaseout) of $2,958,
resulting in a total EIC of $5,916 for the family. As a married couple,
they will start (before phaseout) with a smaller EIC and they will be
subject to a much larger phaseout reduction. Their after-phaseout
two-child EIC will be only $1,935.51 Thus, their joint return EIC is
almost $4,000 less than the combined EICs they could properly claim
if they were not married. Of their total marriage penalty of $4,271,
about 93% is attributable to the EIC.
47. I.R.C. § 152(c) (defining “qualifying child” for purposes of both the child tax
credit and the dependency exemption).
48. Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 540.
49. Id.
50. I.R.C. § 152(c)(4)(B)(ii) provides a tiebreaker rule for the EIC. If both unmarried
parents claim the same child for EIC purposes, and if the child resides with both parents
for the same amount of time during the year, then the child goes to the parent with the
higher adjusted gross income. However, this rule applies only to resolve conflicts resulting
from both parents filing returns claiming the same child. If the parents amicably divide
their children for EIC purposes, with each parent claiming a different child on his or her
return, the tiebreaker rule does not apply. A previous version of the EIC tiebreaker rules
did not depend on conflicting claims as a trigger. Under that version, all children were
allocated to the higher-income parent (assuming each parent otherwise qualified to claim
the children), without regard to whether conflicting claims to the children had been made
on the parents’ tax returns. Sutherland v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1001, 1005 (2001).
51. The two-child EIC phaseout rules reduce the credit by 21.06 cents for every dollar
by which adjusted gross income exceeds the threshold amount. I.R.C § 32(b)(1)(A). The
maximum two-child credit of $5,460 is reduced by $3,525, which is 21.06% of the amount
by which $40,000 adjusted gross income exceeds the $23,260 phaseout threshold.
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As in the one-child situation, the maximum marriage penalty on
the two-child two-earner couple is much larger than the maximum
marriage bonus for a two-child one-earner couple. Married, a twochild one-earner couple will have a joint return tax liability (taking
into account all relevant provisions, including the EIC) of negative
$2,755. If they were unmarried and the earning partner filed as a head
of household (and claimed both children and the non-earning partner
as dependents), the earning partner’s tax would be negative $1,173.50.
Thus, the marriage bonus is $1,581.50. For two-child married couples
with $40,000 in combined income, the maximum marriage penalty of
$4,271 is 2.7 times the marriage bonus of $1,581.50.
At $90,000 combined income, with the phaseout of the EIC
complete and the phaseout of the child tax credit not yet begun, the
analysis of marriage penalties and bonuses centers on the tax rate
schedule of § 1 of the Code and on the standard deduction. Because
the bracket widths (in the relevant brackets) and the standard
deduction amount for joint returns are twice those for single
taxpayers (other than heads of households52), childless partners with
$45,000 income each will pay the same tax whether married or
unmarried. At income of $90,000 a one-earner childless married
couple enjoys a very substantial marriage bonus of $5,283.75 (the
difference between their joint return liability of $9,547.50 and the
$14,831.25 tax on the unmarried earning partner, assuming the
earning partner claims the non-earning partner as a dependent).
If there is a child, the availability of head-of-household status for
one unmarried partner creates a moderate-sized marriage penalty of
$628.75 for an equal-income couple.53 As at the $40,000 income level,
here too it is ironic that the system eliminates marriage penalties for
all childless couples but not for all couples with children. However,
with a much smaller maximum marriage penalty at $90,000 than at
$40,000, the irony at $90,000 is considerably less striking.
At the $1,000,000 combined income level, marriage penalties
return with a vengeance. With the EIC, child tax credit, and
dependency exemptions all fully phased out, the presence or absence

52. I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 1(c) (bracket widths); id. § 63(c)(2) (standard deduction).
53. The joint return liability, after reduction by the child tax credit, is $7,955. If the
partners are unmarried, the partner filing as head of household (and claiming the child tax
credit and the dependency exemption) will owe $2,552.50 and the other partner will owe
$4,773.75, for a total of $7,326.25.
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of children has very little effect on marriage penalties and bonuses.54
Accordingly, the following example assumes a childless couple, with
$500,000 income for each partner. Marriage penalties for equalincome and similar-income couples are large at this income level,
because toward the top of the tax rate schedule the joint return
bracket widths are nearly the same as the single taxpayer bracket
widths.55 Two childless taxpayers, each with $500,000 income (and
claiming the standard deduction), will have a tax liability of $152,591
each, for a total of $305,182. Married, their joint return tax would be
$337,842. The marriage penalty of $32,660 is impressive in absolute
terms, and is substantial even as a percentage of their combined pretax incomes (3.27%). The marriage bonus for a one-earner couple at
$1,000,000 is not nearly so large. The unmarried earning partner
would owe tax of $350,591, which would be reduced by marriage by
only $12,749 (to $337,842).
A few tax marriage effects not implicated in the above examples
are also worth mentioning here. First, the alternative minimum tax
(“AMT”)56 features parameters sharply tilted toward marriage
penalties. At the $800,000 combined income level, there is no AMT
marriage bonus for a one-earner couple, whereas an equal-income
two-earner married couple will face an AMT marriage penalty of
$3,650. This extreme imbalance is explained by the fact that the only
relevant tax parameter—the breakpoint between the 26% and 28%
brackets in the AMT tax rate schedule—is identical for joint returns
and for single taxpayers.57
Of course, the other notable feature of this AMT example is that,
even with its maximum tilt toward marriage penalties, the penalty on
the two-earner couple is not very large. It is less than half of one
percent of the couple’s combined pre-tax income. The explanation for
the combination of maximum tilt and small penalty is that the size of
tax marriage effects—whether penalties, bonuses, or both—is a
function of the extent of the system’s marginal tax rate progressivity.
Above the income level at which the phaseout of the AMT
54. The availability of head-of-household filing status, I.R.C. § 2(b), for an unmarried
partner with a child remains a source of marriage penalties at this income level, but the
penalties thus created are very small in percentage-of-income terms.
55. In 2014, the 35% bracket begins at $405,100 for both joint returns and single
taxpayers, while the 39.6% bracket begins at $406,750 for single taxpayers and at $457,600
for joint returns. Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 538–39.
56. I.R.C. §§ 55–59.
57. The AMT exemption amount is fully phased out at this income level, so it is not a
relevant parameter for these taxpayers.
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exemption is complete, the flatness of the AMT is marred only by the
shift from a 26% to a 28% rate at the $182,500 income level.58 Even
with the maximum tilt toward penalties (resulting from the
specification of the same breakpoint between the two rates for joint
returns and for returns of unmarried taxpayers), the maximum
penalty is only $182,500 x (28% – 26%) = $3,650. If Congress had
chosen the other extreme, setting the breakpoint at $365,000 for joint
returns, the maximum marriage bonus (for a one-earner couple)
would also have been only $3,650. And if Congress had set the joint
return breakpoint at any amount between $182,500 and $365,000, the
sum of the absolute values of the maximum marriage penalty and the
maximum marriage bonus would also have been $3,650.59
As noted at the beginning of this Article, a progressive marginal
rate structure is one of the three horns of the marriage tax trilemma.
Decreasing the progressivity of the rate structure does not eliminate
tax marriage effects (as long as some marginal rate progressivity
remains), but it can greatly reduce the magnitude of the effects.
Opinions will differ, of course, as to whether reducing the size of
marriage effects is an important enough goal to warrant a significant
reduction in the progressivity of the rate structure.
Three other tax marriage effects not implicated in the above
examples were introduced in 2010 by the Affordable Care Act.60
Section 1411 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax at the rate
of 3.8% on the lesser of (1) a taxpayer’s net investment income or (2)
the amount by which the taxpayer’s modified adjusted gross income
exceeds a threshold amount.61 The threshold amount is $200,000 for
single taxpayers and $250,000 for joint returns.62 Unmarried partners,
each with $200,000 of investment income (and no other income),
would not be subject to the tax. If they were married, they would owe
tax of $5,700 (3.8% of the $150,000 of income above the threshold).
The maximum marriage bonus for a one-income couple at the same
combined income level is much smaller. A single taxpayer with
58. I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A); Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, 541.
59. Suppose, for example, Congress “split the difference” by setting the joint return
breakpoint at $273,750. Then the maximum penalty and the maximum bonus would each
be $91,250 x (28% – 26%) = $ 1,825, and the sum of the absolute values would be $3,650.
60. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C).
61. I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1).
62. Id. § 1411(b).
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$400,000 of investment income (and no other income) would owe tax
of $7,600 (3.8% of $200,000). Marriage to a spouse with no income
(investment or otherwise) would reduce the tax to $5,700, for a
marriage bonus of only $1,900. The maximum penalty is thus three
times the maximum bonus.
The Affordable Care Act also introduced the “[a]dditional
[Medicare] tax,” imposed at the rate of 0.9% on wages and selfemployment income in excess of $250,000 (joint return) or $200,000
(unmarried taxpayer).63 Because the joint return threshold is only
slightly higher than the single taxpayer threshold, this tax is also
skewed toward marriage penalties.
The premium assistance credit (“PAC”) of § 36B of the Code
(another innovation of the Affordable Care Act), which can produce
some very large marriage effects, is also strongly tilted toward
penalties.64 The credit is available to low- and moderate-income
taxpayers purchasing individual or family health insurance through a
state-based health insurance exchange (or through a federallyestablished exchange, in the absence of a state-run exchange). To be
credit-eligible, a taxpayer must have “household income” of at least
100% but not more than 400% of the federal poverty level (as
adjusted for family size),65 and must not be covered by Medicare or by
affordable employer-sponsored health insurance.66 The generosity of
the credit decreases as household income increases. The credit
amount is set so that the after-credit cost of basic health insurance
does not exceed a specified percentage of the taxpayer’s household
income, with the specified percentage decreasing as household
income (expressed as a percentage of the federal poverty level)
increases.67
The term “household income” might lead one to suppose that
the PAC rules would aggregate the incomes of unmarried
cohabitants, with the result that the PAC would never produce either
marriage bonuses or marriage penalties (relative to the cohabitation
alternative). However, the technical definition of household income
includes only the incomes of the taxpayer and any persons whom the
taxpayer claims as a dependent (and who are required to file tax
63. Id. §§ 1401(b)(2)(A) (self-employment income), 3101(b)(2) (wages).
64. See id. § 36B.
65. Id. § 36B(c)(1)(A).
66. See id. §§ 36B(c)(2)(A), 36B(c)(2)(C)(iii) (stating exceptions for minimum
essential coverage).
67. Id. § 36B(b)(3)(A).
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returns of their own).68 Because of this claimed-as-a-dependent rule,
the incomes of a two-earner cohabiting couple would not be
aggregated as household income.
As an example of the marriage effects of these rules, imagine two
childless cohabiting partners, each with income of $17,235 (150% of
the federal poverty level for a one-person household, for purposes of
PAC determinations for 201469). Assume that each partner satisfies
all the eligibility criteria for the PAC, and that the cost of basic
individual health insurance for each is $4,000 for the year. Each is
entitled to a credit sufficient to reduce the after-credit cost of health
insurance to 4.0% of his or her income.70 This works out to a credit of
$3,311 ($4,000 – $689) per person, for a combined credit amount of
$6,662. If they were married, their household income of $34,470
would equal approximately 222% of the federal poverty level for a
family of two.71 The increase from 150% to 222% results because
marriage doubles household income, while the two-person-household
poverty level is only 35% greater than the one-person level.72 At
222% of the poverty level the after-credit cost of insurance is set at
7.1% of household income,73 which for this couple is $2,447. If their
combined pre-credit insurance cost remains $8,000, their credit will be
$5,553 ($8,000 – $2,447). The marriage penalty is $1,069 ($6,662 –
$5,553).
What about one-earner couples? At first glance, it might seem
that they would enjoy modest marriage bonuses under the PAC,
because marriage increases their household size and thus increases
their official poverty level. As the statute is written, however, a oneearner couple does not need to be married to be treated as a twoperson household for purposes of the PAC. If one partner has no
income, the earning partner can claim the non-earning partner as a
dependent, and the allowance of the dependency exemption triggers
the treatment of the partners as members of a two-person household

68. Id. § 36B(d)(2)(A).
69. See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5182, 5183 (Jan.
24, 2013) [hereinafter Annual Update] (listing the federal poverty level for a one-person
household as $11,490).
70. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A).
71. To derive these numbers, see Annual Update, supra note 69, at 5183 (listing the
federal poverty level for a two-person family as $15,510) and author’s calculation.
72. See Annual Update, supra note 69, at 5183 ($15,510 versus $11,490).
73. To derive these numbers, see I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A) (listing the percentage range
for household income in the 200%–250% tier as 6.3%–8.05%) and author’s calculations.
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for PAC purposes.74 The result of the inconsistent treatment of
unmarried cohabitants—as two separate one-person households in
the case of a two-earner couple, but as a single two-person household
in the case of a one-earner couple—is a combination of large
marriage penalties for two-earner couples and marriage neutrality
(relative to cohabitation) for one-earner couples.
Most recently, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 201275
contributed to the skewing of the income tax toward marriage
penalties at higher income levels by reinstating and amending the socalled Pease and PEP provisions. The threshold for the application of
the “overall limitation on itemized deductions” of Code § 68 (Pease)
is only slightly higher for joint returns ($300,000 for 2013, with
inflation adjustments in later years) than for heads of households
($275,000 in 2013) and for other unmarried taxpayers ($250,000).76
The effect, of course, is a tilt toward marriage penalties. The
reinstated § 151(d)(3) phaseout of personal and dependency
exemptions (PEP) features the same AGI thresholds as Pease, with
the result that PEP is also skewed toward marriage penalties.77
B.

What Do We Know About the Actual Distribution of Marriage
Penalties and Bonuses?

The overall distribution of marriage penalties and bonuses at any
given income level in the population depends, of course, not only on
whether the statutory rules are skewed toward bonuses or toward
penalties, but also on how incomes are actually distributed between
partners at that income level. Imagine, for example, a system skewed
toward penalties in the sense that the maximum marriage penalty (on
an equal-income couple) at a particular income level is three times
the maximum bonus (for a one-earner couple) at the same income
level. Despite that skewing, if one-earner couples greatly outnumber
two-earner couples at that income level, then couples presented with
marriage bonuses would outnumber couples facing marriage
penalties, and the total dollar amount of bonuses might exceed the

74. I.R.C. § 36B(d)(1) (defining family size); see also id. § 36B(b)(1)(2)(A) (allowing
a credit based on the cost of health insurance coverage for a dependent of the taxpayer).
75. Pub. L. No. 112-240, 126 Stat. 2313.
76. I.R.C. § 68(b)(1).
77. See id. § 151(d)(3)(A) (“In the case of any taxpayer whose adjusted gross income
for the taxable year exceeds the applicable amount in effect under section 68(b), the
exemption amount shall be reduced by the applicable percentage.”).
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total dollar amount of penalties. What do we know about the actual
distribution of penalties and bonuses?
The available studies are less recent than one might wish, but
they generally indicate an overall skewing toward marriage penalties,
especially in the lower-income ranges. Examining joint filers for tax
year 2000, Janet Holtzblatt and Robert Rebelein found that 48.3% of
jointly filing married couples were subject to marriage penalties,
41.9% enjoyed marriage bonuses, and 9.8% had neither penalty nor
bonus.78 With total penalties of $30.0 billion and total bonuses of
$28.5 billion, the net result was a marriage penalty of $1.5 billion.79
Holtzblatt and Rebelein also isolated EIC-caused tax marriage
effects. Considering all tax provisions except the EIC, they found that
44.6% of joint filers faced marriage penalties, 43.3% received
marriage bonuses, and 12.1% had neither penalty nor bonus; the
overall effect was a net bonus of $2.0 billion.80 The EIC, by contrast,
produced a net marriage penalty of $3.6 billion.81 The bulk (about
55%) of EIC marriage penalties fell on couples with combined
incomes between $30,000 and $60,000.82 Of EIC claimants filing joint
returns, considering their overall federal income tax situations (not
just the EIC), 30.1% had marriage penalties, 28.7% had bonuses, and
41.2% had neither; the net marriage penalty for EIC claimants was
$682 million.83
More recently, Emily Lin and Patricia Tong have looked at the
other side of the coin—the marriage penalties and bonuses that would
be experienced by cohabiting couples if they were married.84
Analyzing data from tax year 2007, they found that 48% of cohabiting
couples would have faced marriage penalties of an average of $1,657,
38% would have received bonuses averaging $914, and 15% would
have had neither penalty nor bonus.85 The presence of children was
associated with an increased likelihood of potential marriage
78. Janet Holtzblatt & Robert Rebelein, Measuring the Effect of the EITC on
Marriage Penalties and Bonuses, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1107, 1117 (2000).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1119.
83. Id. Note that limiting the analysis to married couples claiming the EIC misses the
marriage penalties on couples whose EICs were fully phased out under the joint return
rules, but who would have been able to claim EICs if not married.
84. See generally Emily Y. Lin & Patricia K. Tong, Marriage and Taxes: What Can We
Learn from Tax Returns Filed by Cohabiting Couples?, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 807 (2012)
(examining tax returns of cohabiting couples).
85. Id. at 809.
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penalties. Only 38% of childless couples would have faced penalties if
married, compared with 52% of couples where one partner had
children and 92% of couples where both partners had children.86 The
association of children with would-be marriage penalties was largely
due to the EIC. Although 71% of unmarried couples with children
claimed the EIC, only 32% of couples with children would have been
EIC-eligible if married.87 For unmarried couples with children, the
average avoided EIC marriage penalty was $1,761, which constituted
more than 80% of the group’s average overall avoided penalty of
$2,175.88
III. DOING SOMETHING ABOUT TAX MARRIAGE EFFECTS
Having examined the different balances struck by Congress
between marriage penalties and bonuses at different income levels,
this Article now considers whether there might be any plausible
justification for those differences, and (in Part IV) what should be
done if the present differences cannot be defended.
Consider, as a starting point, the explanations Congress and the
executive branch have offered over the past few decades for some of
the landmarks of marriage-affecting income tax rules. The extreme
tilt toward marriage penalties at the high end of the rate structure was
introduced by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which
added a new top rate of 39.6%, imposed—in the case of both joint
returns and single taxpayers—on income above $250,000.89
One might have expected some explanation from Congress as to
why the new top bracket was designed in this marriage-penaltymaximizing way, but no such explanation was forthcoming. The
provision originated with a proposal by the Clinton administration,
which offered no explanation at all for the decision to maximize
marriage penalties.90 Without mentioning the difference between
joint and individual returns, the administration had simply proposed
“an additional 10 percent surtax for those people with taxable income

86. Id. at 819.
87. Id. at 815.
88. Id. at 820.
89. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13202, 107
Stat. 312, 461.
90. See WILLIAM J. CLINTON, A VISION OF CHANGE FOR AMERICA 103 (1993)
(discussing the tax code change). Clinton’s proposal was enacted in section 13202(a) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13202(a), 107 Stat. 312,
461 (codified at I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e) (2012)).
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over $250,000, resulting in a 39.6% tax rate for those income
levels . . . .”91 The administration’s proposed high-income marriage
penalty attracted only a smattering media and political attention at
the time, although it was the focus of a story in the Wall Street
Journal.92 The story noted that a “Treasury Department spokesman
didn’t return phone calls” from the Journal inquiring about the
marriage penalty effects of the proposal.93 The relevant publication of
the House Ways and Means Committee shed no light on the decision
to emphasize marriage penalties for high-income taxpayers.94 One
suspects that the administration (and Congress, following the
administration’s lead) simply decided that a quarter of a million
dollars worked well, in sound-bite terms, as a threshold for the
imposition of the new top rate, and that creating different thresholds
for different filing statuses would have been too complicated for
sound-bite purposes.
The complete elimination for childless couples of marriage
penalties caused by the standard deduction and the 10% and 15%
rate brackets was accomplished by the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.95 In its General Explanation of the
2001 legislation, the Joint Committee on Taxation noted that
“Congress was concerned about the inequity that arises when two
working single individuals marry and experience a tax increase solely
by reason of their marriage.”96 Moreover, “Congress believed that an
increase in the standard deduction for married couples filing a joint
return . . . was a responsible reduction of the marriage tax penalty,”97
and that the expansion of the 15% rate bracket for joint returns
“would alleviate the effects of the present-law marriage tax
penalty.”98 As an explanation for the particular policy choices
embodied in the 2001 legislation—the skewing toward marriage
bonuses, and the elimination of penalties for childless spouses but not

91. CLINTON, supra note 90, at 103.
92. Ellen E. Schultz, Marriage Could Become Too Dear if Changes in Tax Law Go
Through, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 1993, at C1.
93. Id.
94. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D CONG., FISCAL YEAR 1994
BUDGET RECONCILIATION RECOMMENDATIONS 197–98 (Comm. Print 1993).
95. Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 101, 301–302, 115 Stat. 38, 41, 53–54 (codified as amended
at I.R.C. §§ 1(f), 1(i), 63(c) (2012)).
96. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX LEGIS. ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONG. 25 (J. Comm. Print 2003).
97. Id. at 25–26.
98. Id. at 27.
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for those with children99—these conclusory statements are almost
laughably inadequate. Again, one suspects the real explanation may
have more to do with sound bites than with the policy merits. The
2001 Act enabled legislators to claim Congress was not merely
reducing penalties, but actually eliminating them for the typical
middle-income, two-earner couple—at least if one’s typical middleincome couple has no children.
What about the opposite skewing—toward marriage penalties
rather than bonuses—attributable to the EIC? Before the 2001
legislation, the EIC phaseout thresholds were identical for joint
returns and for individual returns,100 resulting in an extreme tilt
toward marriage penalties in the operation of the phaseout. The 2001
Act provided (on a delayed basis) for a joint return phaseout
threshold $3,000 higher than the single taxpayer threshold.101 Even
after this increase in the joint return phaseout threshold, the EIC
phaseout rules remained heavily tilted in the direction of marriage
penalties.102 The Joint Committee on Taxation’s description of what
Congress had in mind fails to elucidate why Congress settled on such
limited relief—especially considering that the same Congress had
opted for much more extensive marriage penalty relief in the case of
the standard deduction and the lower rate brackets.103 The Joint
Committee merely observed that “Congress believed increasing the
phase-out amount for married taxpayers who filed a joint return
would help to alleviate [the EIC marriage] penalty.”104 This does
nothing to explain why it was appropriate for Congress to eliminate
marriage penalties in the standard deduction and lower rate brackets

99. The skewing toward bonuses is a result of the standard deduction, and the 10%
and 15% rate brackets, being made twice as large for joint returns as for unmarried
taxpayers (other than heads of households). Id. at 26–27. The failure to eliminate all
marriage penalties for spouses with children results from the joint return standard
deduction not being as large as the combined standard deductions for a single taxpayer
and a head of household (and similarly for the 10% and 15% brackets). Id. at 27.
100. Id. at 31 tbl.7 (setting forth the EIC parameters for 2001).
101. Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 303, 115 Stat. 38, 55 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 32
(2012)).
102. Even if the $3,000 increase in the joint return phase-out threshold had been
immediately effective in 2001, the resulting joint return threshold ($16,090) would have
been only 23% higher than the single taxpayer threshold ($13,090). For the 2001 EIC
phase-out thresholds, see Rev. Proc. 2001-13, 2001-1 C.B. 337, 339, at § 3.03.
103. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX LEGIS. ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONG. 31–33 (J. Comm. Print 2003).
104. Id. at 31.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 783 (2015)

2015] DIFFERING TAX TREATMENTS OF MARRIAGE

809

(at least for childless couples), while at the same time only modestly
reducing EIC marriage penalties.
In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009,
Congress provided a modest additional amount of EIC marriage
penalty relief, increasing the joint return phaseout threshold to $5,000
more than the single taxpayer threshold.105 The Joint Committee’s
explanation of what Congress had in mind on this occasion was, if
anything, even less illuminating that its explanation of the motivation
for the 2001 EIC marriage penalty relief.106 One suspects the real
explanation for the skewing of the EIC toward marriage penalties can
be found in a combination of early legislative inattention and laterpath dependence. The pre-2001 identical phaseout thresholds for
married and single taxpayers appear to have been based on a
legislative failure even to think about EIC marriage impacts, rather
than on a considered decision to maximize penalties and avoid
bonuses.107 In 2001, when Congress finally became aware of the
extreme tilt toward penalties and decided to do something about it,
Congress naturally defined “doing something” relative to the status
quo.108 Starting from the greatest possible skewing toward penalties in
the EIC phaseout rules, Congress could accurately claim to have done
something, even as the system remained heavily skewed toward
penalties after the enactment of marriage penalty relief. More
extensive EIC penalty relief either would have been quite costly to
the fisc, or would have required reducing EIC benefits for unmarried
recipients (thus making joint return EIC benefits more attractive by
comparison, without making them more attractive in absolute terms).
Apparently willing to spend only so much on the EIC and apparently
unwilling to reduce existing benefits for unmarried credit recipients,
but clearly wanting to do something about EIC marriage penalties,

105. American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 1002(a), 123 Stat. 115, 312 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 32(b)).
106. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX LEGIS. ENACTED IN THE 111TH CONG. 21–22 (J. Comm. 2011) (providing reasons for
increasing the generosity of the tax credit for families with three or more children, but
providing no reason for the additional marriage penalty relief).
107. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no committee reports on pre-2001 EIC
legislation make any mention of marriage penalties or bonuses in the EIC rules.
108. See supra notes 80–83 (describing Congress’s 2001 epiphany concerning EIC
marriage penalties).
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Congress settled on EIC phaseout rules still skewed toward penalties
(albeit less so than before enactment of the relief).109
The very different, pro-marriage, tilt of the standard deduction
and lower brackets is best explained by the different status quo in
those areas as of 2001 (when Congress made marriage penalty relief a
major legislative theme).110 Having decided to do something about
marriage penalties in the standard deduction and the lower
brackets,111 Congress started from a status quo reflecting a
compromise between penalties and bonuses, and converted it to a
system severely tilted toward bonuses.112 Having decided at the same
time to do something about marriage penalties in the phaseout of the
EIC, Congress started with a penalties-only system and converted it
into a mostly-penalties regime.113
In short, consideration of official explanations and reasonable
speculations about actual legislative motivations do not (to put it
mildly) inspire confidence that Congress has made informed and
thoughtful decisions to favor marriage penalties at lower income
levels, to favor bonuses in the middle income ranges, and to favor
penalties (again) at the top of the income distribution. Of course, it is
possible that the current pattern happens to make good policy sense,
despite the fact that Congress stumbled into it. But does it?
Consider first the lower income ranges. When it fundamentally
reformed welfare in 1996, Congress set forth at the very beginning of
its landmark legislation its findings that “[m]arriage is the foundation
of a successful society,” and that “[m]arriage is an essential institution
of a successful society which promotes the interests of children.”114
Congress also noted a number of “well documented” “negative
consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the mother, the child, the
family, and society . . . .”115 There is, in fact, a considerable amount of
evidence that marriage is associated with a wide range of better
109. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 303, 115 Stat. 38, 55 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 32).
110. Title III of the 2001 legislation had the heading, “Marriage Penalty Relief.” Id. at
tit. 3, 115 Stat. at 53–57.
111. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF TAX LEGIS. ENACTED IN THE 107TH CONG. 25–27 (J. Comm. 2003).
112. Id. at 25–28 (describing, in general terms, the status quo rules, and describing the
2001 changes).
113. Id. at 29–34 (describing the prior EIC rules and the 2001 changes).
114. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 101(1)–(2), 110 Stat. 2105, 2110 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601
(2012)).
115. Id. at § 101(8), 110 Stat. at 2111.
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outcomes (for example, in terms of health, education, and finances)
than cohabitation, for both parents and their children.116
As is suggested by the fact that Congress chose to extol the
benefits of marriage in the context of welfare reform legislation, the
public policy reasons to favor marriage over cohabitation would seem
to be particularly acute at the lower end of the income distribution. If
our major concern is for the well-being of children, it is notable that
cohabiting couples with children tend to be less educated and poorer
than childless cohabiting couples.117 Of cohabiting couples (ages 30 to
44) without college degrees, 67% live with children.118 By comparison,
of cohabiting couples in the same age range with college degrees—
and with roughly twice the average income of the non-degree
couples119—only 33% lived with children.120 All this suggests that
Congress should be particularly concerned that the tax system reward
marriage—or at least not penalize it—in the case of lower-income
couples with children, at least if the primary legislative concern is the
well-being of children. And yet this group faces tax marriage penalties
that are large in absolute dollar terms, and by far the largest penalties
facing any demographic slice in percentage-of-income terms.
To be sure, both quantitative and qualitative studies suggest that
lower-income couples are not much influenced by tax penalties (or
bonuses) in deciding between marriage and cohabitation.
Quantitative studies examining the influence of marriage penalties
and bonuses on couples throughout the income distribution have
concluded either that penalties and bonuses have no effect on
marriage rates,121 or that the effects are quite small.122 Quantitative

116. See, e.g., LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY
36–46 (2000); Sheela Kennedy & Larry Bumpass, Cohabitation and Children’s Living
Arrangements: New Estimates from the United States, 19 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 1663, 1665
(2008) (citing a number of studies in support of the proposition that “[c]hildren raised by a
cohabiting parent appear to have poorer outcomes than the children of married parents,
across a range of indicators, including academic performance, emotional problems and
depression, and behavioral problems and delinquency”).
117. RICHARD FRY & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., LIVING TOGETHER:
THE ECONOMICS OF COHABITATION 18–21 (2011).
118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. at 1.
120. Id. at 18.
121. David L. Sjoquist & Mary Beth Walker, The Marriage Tax and the Rate and
Timing of Marriage, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 547, 556 (1995) (finding no tax effect on marriage
rates, although finding some tax-motivated shifting of marriage timing between the end of
one year and the beginning of the next).
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studies focused on lower-income couples similarly find no tax effects
on marriage rates, or only small effects.123 In qualitative, interviewbased studies, lower-income couples almost never tell researchers that
tax considerations have influenced their choice between marriage and
cohabitation.124
On the other hand, it is certainly possible that some couples’
decisions are influenced by tax penalties and bonuses, despite the
couples’ lack of awareness of that influence. As Adam Carasso and
Eugene Steuerle have commented, “People may react to incentives
even when they do not calculate them, as when partners choose to
cohabit . . . because they simply observe that unmarried couples have
a higher standard of living than those who marry . . . .”125 Moreover,
the most recent quantitative study, by Hayley Fisher, finds larger tax
effects on marriage decisions than the earlier quantitative studies,
especially for low-income couples.126 Fisher calculates that a $1,000
122. James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital
Decisions?, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 565, 571 (1995) (“[T]axes affect at least some marital
decisions of at least some individuals, but . . . for many individuals taxes are largely
irrelevant.”); James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Shacking Up or Shelling Out: Income
Taxes, Marriage, and Cohabitation, 1 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 169, 182–84 (2003)
(finding that cohabiting couples are less likely to marry when marriage would increase
their tax liability; the effect is small but statistically significant).
123. Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Scott Houser, EITC and Marriage, 55 NAT’L TAX J. 25, 37
(2002) (concluding that marriage penalties and bonuses created by “the EITC expansions
during the early- to mid-1990s had little or no effect on the marriage decision . . .”); David
T. Ellwood, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Social Policy Reforms on
Work, Marriage, and Living Arrangements, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1063, 1099 (2000) (finding
some indications that “EITC incentives may influence cohabitation versus marriage
decisions”).
124. Kathryn Edin & Joanne M. Reed, Why Don’t They Just Get Married? Barriers to
Marriage Among the Disadvantaged, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 117, 128 (2005) (“[H]ardly
any of the mothers or fathers in these studies named . . . the potential loss of the EITC
(which poor unmarried parents typically refer to as their ‘tax return’) as a barrier to
marriage.”); see Christina M. Gibson-Davis, Kathryn Edin & Sara McLanahan, High
Hopes but Even Higher Expectations: The Retreat from Marriage Among Low-Income
Couples, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1301, 1307–08 (2005) (finding that “the overwhelming
majority [of those surveyed] indicated that they needed to get their finances in order
before they could get married”); Pamela J. Smock, Wendy D. Manning & Meredith
Porter, “Everything’s There Except Money”: How Money Shapes Decisions to Marry
Among Cohabitors, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 680, 686–92 (2005) (reporting that many
low-income couples in interviews cited financial concerns as obstacles to marriage, but not
reporting that any couples mentioned tax marriage penalties).
125. Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerle, The Hefty Penalty on Marriage Facing
Many Households with Children, 15 FUTURE OF CHILD. 157, 161–62 (2005).
126. Hayley Fisher, The Effect of Marriage Tax Penalties and Subsidies on Marital
Status, 34 FISCAL STUD. 437, 439, 453 (2013) (estimating that “a 1 per cent increase in
household income just for being married increases the probability of being married by 1.1
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increase in the marriage penalty is associated with a 1.7 percentage
point decrease in the probability of marriage (across the entire
income distribution), and that the greatest responsiveness is among
persons with the least education; in the lowest educational group a
$1,000 penalty increase is associated with a 2.7 percentage point
decrease in the probability of marriage.127
For two reasons, the studies finding that marital decisions of
lower-income couples are not very responsive to tax penalties (and
bonuses) are of little help to anyone attempting to defend the
legislative tilt toward marriage penalties. First, as suggested by the
observation of Carasso and Steuerle and by the findings of Fisher, the
jury is still out on the extent of the behavioral effects. Second, if the
behavioral effects do turn out to be very small, that merely shifts the
basis for the objection from concerns about behavioral effects to
concerns about fairness. If a lower-income couple chooses marriage
over cohabitation, and thereby suffers a marriage penalty of several
thousand dollars, it must be either because the partners are unaware
of the tax penalty or because the partners believe so strongly in
marriage that they are willing to suffer the penalty as a price of
marriage. In the former case the ignorance is non-culpable, given the
opaqueness to most taxpayers of the inner workings of the income
tax.128 In the latter case, the partners’ attitude of tax-penalties-bedamned verges on heroism. In neither case does it seem fair for the
federal government to adopt a tax system tilted toward penalizing
couples choosing marriage. In short, there is no easy or obvious way
to construct an argument for tilting toward marriage penalties for
lower-income parents; it would be considerably easier to make the
case for a tilt in the opposite direction.
What about the severe skewing toward marriage bonuses in the
case of couples with incomes in the high-five-figure range? It is not
obvious why the income tax rules should be at their most marriagefriendly in this income range. An argument in defense of the tilt might
be based on the benefits to children of having married (rather than

per cent. . . . These estimates are four times larger than those found in the previous
literature”).
127. Id. at 440.
128. See Lawrence Zelenak, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM.
J. TAX L. 91, 93, 118–19 (2010) (arguing that complex tax provisions “turn the income tax
into a black box, the inner workings of which are incomprehensible to the average
taxpayer, thereby undermining . . . the ability of taxpayers to engage in informed tax
planning”).
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cohabitating) parents. From that perspective, however, it is strange
that the income tax rules in this income range are more pro-marriage
for childless couples than for couples with children.129 Even limiting
the analysis to the tax treatment of couples with children, it is
mystifying (on the merits) why Congress would lean toward
subsidizing marriage for middle-income couples while leaning in the
opposite direction for lower-income couples. If Congress is concerned
about the well-being of children living with unmarried cohabiting
parents, that concern should be greater in the case of children in
families with incomes in the $30,000 to $50,000 range than in the case
of children in families with incomes in the $75,000 to $100,000
range—both because such children in the lower-income range
outnumber such children in the higher range by more than five to
one,130 and because the children in the lower-income families are
more economically vulnerable. Yet the pattern of marriage penalties
and bonuses—skewed toward penalties at $30,000 to $50,000 and
toward bonuses at $75,000 to $100,000131—suggests Congress is, for
some strange reason, more solicitous of the well-being of the children
in the higher-income families. Whatever may be the appropriate
balance between marriage penalties and bonuses for middle-income
couples, it is difficult to imagine a persuasive justification for tilting
toward bonuses at that income level while tilting toward penalties
farther down the income distribution. Nor am I aware of any
attempted justification—persuasive or otherwise—even having been
offered.
Finally, what about the very differently situated couples with
incomes at or approaching $1,000,000, for whom marriage penalties
predominate? The top rate brackets for joint returns begin at the
same or nearly the same income levels as the top rate brackets for
unmarried taxpayers;132 the maximum marriage penalty at $1,000,000
combined income is very large in absolute terms—more than
$32,000—and is more than 2.5 times the maximum marriage bonus at
that income level.133 One might weakly defend the current system on
the basis that marriage penalties and bonuses at that income level
129. See supra Part II.A.
130. VESPA ET AL., supra note 33, at 25 tbl.10 (indicating that 609,000 children were
living with unmarried cohabiting parents in the $30,000 to $50,000 family income range,
compared with 111,000 children living with unmarried cohabiting parents in the $75,000 to
$100,000 family income range).
131. See supra Part II.A.
132. See supra text accompanying note 55.
133. See supra Table 1.
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matter very little in terms of children’s well-being. Of all children
living with both parents in families with incomes of $100,000 or more
(the Census Bureau statistics lump together all six- and seven-figure
family incomes), only 0.8% are children of unmarried parents.134 Even
with the skewing toward marriage penalties, very few higher-income
parents opt for cohabitation over marriage.135 Moreover, in that
income range most of the 0.8% should survive relatively unscathed
despite their parents’ lack of marriage licenses. At that income level,
neither parents nor children are likely to suffer undue hardship as a
result of a marriage penalty—not even a marriage penalty of $30,000
or more.
All of the above discussion of marriage penalties among the
wealthy is in the nature of “it could be worse.” As such, it does not
make for a very satisfying defense of the status quo. Even at the high
end of the income distribution, a severe tilt toward marriage penalties
sends an unfortunate message about how Congress does—or does
not—value marriage. Congress has never offered an explanation or
defense of this tilt, and it is unlikely that any convincing defense could
be developed.
IV. CONCLUSION: A FEW TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS
The most important lesson to be gleaned from an examination of
the differing tax marriage effects at different points in the income
distribution is that Congress should make conscious decisions about
the appropriate distributions of penalties and bonuses at various
income levels, instead of stumbling into a set of poorly understood
and almost-impossible-to-defend results. The current effects are
accidents of path dependence and of Congress myopically focusing on
one or a few marriage-affecting provisions at a time, rather than
thinking about a sensible overall approach to income tax marriage
effects.
In this Article I have attempted to demonstrate the need for a
legislative rethinking—or perhaps more accurately a first thinking—
of the distribution of marriage penalties and bonuses. I have not
attempted the next step of prescribing what should be the results of
134. VESPA ET AL., supra note 33, at 25 tbl.10. In that family income range there are
134,000 children living with unmarried cohabiting parents, and 16,836,000 children living
with married parents. Id.
135. See id. (stating that only 134,000 children live in cohabitating households with
incomes over $100,000, while 16,836,000 children in the same income range live in
households with married parents).
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that rethinking. I do, however, tentatively offer a few thoughts on
how Congress should approach the rethinking. First, there should be
a rebuttable presumption that the balance between penalties and
bonuses—however that balance is struck—should be approximately
the same at all income levels. This contrasts sharply with the current
mix of anti-marriage (at the bottom and top) and pro-marriage (in the
middle) policies.
Second, perhaps there should also be a rebuttable presumption
that the most equitable approach is to split the difference, by setting
the maximum bonus (for a one-earner couple) at each income level
equal to the maximum penalty (for an equal-income two-earner
couple) at the same income level. A more sophisticated approach to
splitting the difference, which would present some data analysis
challenges, would be to design the system so that at every income
level the dollar amounts of marriage penalties and bonuses actually
experienced by affected taxpayers were approximately equal and
offsetting.136 Besides the simple intuitive appeal of splitting the
difference, this approach has the virtue of being fair to unmarried
taxpayers—the forgotten men and women of tax policy toward
marriage. If marriage penalties and bonuses offset, then married
people as a group pay the same tax they would pay if they were not
married, and single people as a group are neither burdened by having
to pay extra tax to make up for a net marriage bonus nor benefitted
by a tax reduction caused by a net marriage penalty.
The most likely candidate for the rebutting of both presumptions
is a tilting toward bonuses for lower-income parents. This is where the
best case can be made for the importance of pro-marriage public
policy. This would be, of course, precisely the opposite of the current
approach, under which two-income working class spouses are subject
to the most severe marriage penalties (in percentage-of-income
terms) in the entire system.
Up to this point I have uncritically accepted the legislative
commitments to (1) imposing equal tax on equal-income couples
regardless of the distribution of incomes within marriages, and (2)
progressive marginal rates. However, having considered at length
how difficult (or impossible) it is to find a satisfactory distribution of
the tax marriage effects that unavoidably follow from those

136. For a sense of what would be involved in implementing this approach, see the
discussion supra Part II.B.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 783 (2015)

2015] DIFFERING TAX TREATMENTS OF MARRIAGE

817

commitments, one might reasonably conclude that it is time to
reexamine those commitments.
Marriage penalties and bonuses would both disappear, of course,
if the United States abandoned joint returns for married couples,
thereby renouncing the goal of equal tax on equal-income married
couples. Along with a number of tax commentators, I have long urged
exactly that.137 Anne Alstott has recently offered an especially
powerful argument for the end of joint filing, based on the great
decline in the societal centrality of marriage from the mid-twentieth
century to the present.138 The unavoidable arbitrariness of marriage
penalties and bonuses provides another reason to reconsider our
commitment to joint returns.
It is worth noting in this connection that a policy proposal that
formally retains joint filing may actually violate the principle of equal
tax on equal-income couples. Consider, for example, the possibility of
using a two-earner deduction as a technique for reducing or
eliminating marriage penalties caused by the phaseout of the EIC.139
Suppose the maximum amount of the one-child EIC is $4,000, and
that for an unmarried taxpayer the credit is reduced by 20% of the
amount by which income exceeds $20,000. The standard way of
avoiding all marriage penalties in the design of the phaseout would be
137. See generally Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status As a Factor in
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1980) (“[A] marriage-neutral income
tax system, under which all individuals file separate returns under a single rate schedule, is
the most defensible position in the long run.”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and
the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63
(1993) (“The joint return ought to be abolished. A system that treats each person as a
separate taxable unit is more equitable, more consistent with basic tax principles, more
efficient, and ultimately better able to accomplish social family goals.”); Zelenak, supra
note 26 (“The only way to avoid both marriage bonuses and penalties is to abandon
marital status as a tax determinant and to require that spouses file separate returns.”).
138. See Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and
Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695, 757 (2013). Alstott
concludes:
Joint filing based on formal marriage is particularly ill-suited to the new patterns
of marriage and child-rearing. In the mid-twentieth century, the prevalence,
homogeneity, and exclusivity of formal marriage made it a convenient and
perfectly sound proxy for family. Today, however, joint filing is not a plausible way
of attempting to protect freedom or promote collective welfare.
Id.
139. From 1981 to 1986 the law permitted a two-earner deduction equal to 10% of the
earned income of the lower-earning spouse, up to a maximum deduction of $3,000. See
I.R.C. § 221 (repealed 1986). The proposal discussed in the text would be similar, but
would apply only for purposes of the EIC phaseout.
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to set the phaseout threshold for a married couple at $40,000.140 But
that would not only avoid creating a marriage penalty for spouses
earning $20,000 each; it would also produce a $4,000 marriage bonus
for a one-earner couple with $40,000 income. The two-earner penalty
would be avoided, without creating the one-earner bonus as a side
effect, if the phaseout threshold were set at $20,000 in all cases (that
is, for both single taxpayers and joint returns), but in determining
their income for phaseout purposes married couples were allowed a
deduction equal to the lesser of $20,000 or the income of the lowerearning spouse. In that case, the $40,000 two-earner couple would be
entitled to a $4,000 EIC, while the $40,000 one-earner couple would
receive no credit. That may or may not be considered an appropriate
result, but note that although this approach does not formally
eliminate joint returns, it decisively rejects the principle of equal tax
(or transfers) for equal-income married couples. If we are willing to
go that far, perhaps we would do better simply to eliminate joint
returns.
Marriage penalties and bonuses would also disappear if we gave
up on progressive marginal rates. As noted earlier, this has nearly
happened already at some income levels under the alternative
minimum tax.141 If one is otherwise committed to progressive
marginal rates, the usual—and quite reasonable—response is that the
progressivity principle is more important than avoiding tax marriage
effects. If a commitment to progressivity implies a commitment to
otherwise undesirable marriage penalties and bonuses, then so be it.
A progressive marginal rate structure, however, is best understood as
a tool for producing progressive average rates, rather than as an end
in itself. Might it be possible to produce a desired distribution of
progressive average rates without using progressive marginal rates? It
is certainly possible to produce progressive average rates through a
combination of a universal demogrant (that is, a per-person transfer
payment of some specified amount) and a flat-rate tax. If, for
example, there is a flat tax (with no exemption) of 20% and everyone
is entitled to a demogrant of $10,000, then the average rate at $50,000

140. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 32(b)(a)(A) (2012) (providing a phaseout threshold of 15.98%
for an eligible individual with one qualifying child). As explained in the Article’s
Introduction, the usual method of avoiding marriage penalties is to provide tax parameters
(e.g., standard deduction amounts and bracket widths) twice as large for joint returns as
for the returns of unmarried taxpayers.
141. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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is zero,142 the average rate at $100,000 is 10%,143 the average rate at
$500,000 is 18%,144 and so on. This system would be progressive
despite the absence of progressive marginal rates, and it would
feature neither marriage penalties nor marriage bonuses. Married or
unmarried, two people would have a net combined tax liability equal
to 20% of their combined income minus $20,000.
It may be neither politically possible nor desirable on the merits
to adopt a pure version of a flat-tax-plus-demogrant, but it may be
possible and desirable to slouch some distance in that direction. We
could reduce marginal rate progressivity without reducing average
rate progressivity if we introduced small-scale demogrant-type
programs as we reduced marginal rate progressivity.145 If the marginal
rate structure remained moderately progressive, there would still be
marriage penalties and bonuses, but the size of the tax marriage
effects would have been significantly reduced.
I fondly recall my discussions with Bill Turnier years ago about
the income tax treatment of marriage. Although I favored (then as
now) the elimination of joint returns, Bill’s thoughtful defense of joint
filing greatly influenced (and tempered) my thinking on the issue. I
appreciate the opportunity afforded me by this well-deserved
festschrift in honor of a wonderful friend, colleague, and scholar to
revisit the tax treatment of marriage. I hope (and expect) that Bill will
not mind that, after having accepted the joint return premise for
almost all of this Article, at the end I have smuggled in a bit of an
argument for the end of joint filing. I look forward to renewing our
friendly debate.

142. ($50,000 x 20%) – $10,000 = 0.
143. ($100,000 x 20%) – $10,000 = $10,000; $10,000/$100,000 = 10%.
144. ($500,000 x 20%) – $10,000 = $90,000; $90,000/$500,000 = 18%.
145. For this approach to be revenue neutral and distributionally neutral (assuming
those neutralities are desired), the decrease in marginal rate progressivity would have to
be accomplished by increasing rates in the lower brackets rather than by decreasing rates
in the upper brackets.
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